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Charitable Contributions in Lieu of SALT Deductions
by David Gamage
David Gamage is a
professor of law at
Indiana University’s
Maurer School of Law.
He thanks Andy
Grewal for comments
on an earlier draft and
for prodding me to
write this article.
In this edition of
Academic Perspectives
on SALT, Gamage
discusses the new
federal cap on state and
local tax deductions, noting several ways that
states or the federal government could address
its flaws.
California and other states are considering
new charitable tax credits to do end runs around
the 2017 federal tax overhaul’s cap on state and
1
local tax deductions. Will these plans work?
Yes, but with some qualifications. Along with
seven other tax law professors, I am a coauthor on
a draft essay2 arguing that federal law enables
states to offer tax credits for charitable
contributions to state programs in a manner that
could circumvent the SALT deduction cap. While
I obviously agree with the essay’s analysis, my
views are not fully explicated, which is where this
follow-up comes in.
First, I should specify what we are talking
about. It is helpful here to distinguish between (1)
what I will call the “aggressive way” to structure

1

See, e.g., Riley McDermid, “Move to Work Around Federal Tax Cap
Gets Key Vote From California Lawmakers,” San Francisco Business Times,
Jan. 31, 2018.
2

Joseph Bankman et al., “Federal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions Entitling Donor to a State Tax Credit” (unpublished
manuscript, Jan. 11, 2018).

a state-level tax credit of that sort, and (2) what I
will call the “smarter way” to do so.
The aggressive way to structure this plan is for
a state to offer a 100 percent tax credit for
charitable donations to the state’s general fund.
The goal here is to incentivize state residents
whose federal-level deductions for state-level
taxes will be capped to instead make charitable
contributions to the state government to reduce
their state-level taxes. Under current law,
voluntary donations to state general funds qualify
for the federal-level charitable contribution
deduction. Thus, this plan would allow state
residents to effectively transform nondeductible
state-level tax payments into fully deductible
charitable contribution deductions to the state.
The smarter way to do that would be for a state
to offer a less than 100 percent credit for charitable
donations to funds set up for specific state
programs, with a cap on the total amount
creditable per taxpayer. For instance, a state might
offer a 90 percent credit for donations made to a
fund to support public colleges and universities
with the state. A state could set up multiple funds
to offer choices as to which programs residents
want to support.
Note here that a 90 percent (or lower) credit
would still enable participants to come out ahead
after tax for making a qualifying donation. If a
taxpayer in the new 24 percent federal income tax
bracket were to make a $100 qualifying charitable
contribution through such a program, that
taxpayer would save $90 of state-level taxes and
$24 of federal-level taxes. The full after-tax return
would thus be $114 of combined tax savings from
the $100 contribution.
Do those plans work under federal law? The
answer is clearly yes, at least in the sense that
existing legal authorities overwhelmingly support
them working. Indeed, many states already offer
credits for charitable contributions of that sort,
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with the credit amount reaching 100 percent in
some cases.3 As our group essay explains in
greater depth, the IRS has blessed these programs
(albeit with low-level guidance), and numerous
judicial decisions also support taxpayers’
receiving full federal-level charitable contribution
4
deductions for donations to these programs.
Of course, it is possible to distinguish the legal
authorities that support these plans. Thus, the IRS
could perhaps justify challenging newly enacted
plans, especially for plans structured more like
the aggressive way than the safe way. But the IRS
would face an uphill battle in challenging these
plans based on existing legal authorities.
A more complicated and interesting question
is who has the power to change that aspect of
federal tax law. Congress clearly has the authority
to revise it through legislation that would deny
federal-level charitable contribution deductions
for donations to these programs.
But do Treasury and the IRS have the power to
revise that aspect of federal tax law absent new
legislation? My view is that they could through
exercise of their regulatory authority — that is, by
issuing a new Treasury regulation. However, it’s
less clear whether the IRS could change that
aspect of federal tax law on its own, without using
the Department of the Treasury’s regulatory
powers.
With all of that in mind, should states design
new programs and, if they do, how should
Treasury and the IRS respond? These nuanced
questions lack clear and straightforward answers.
In contrast to at least some of my group essay
coauthors, I consider the prior federal-level SALT
5
deduction to be suboptimal federal policy and
would favor well-designed approaches to cap or
eliminate it. However, the new federal-level cap is
poorly designed.
In particular, I worry that by capping the
federal deduction for state and local personal
income taxes, while leaving business-level
deductions for state and local taxes mostly

3

For a list and explanation of current state-level programs of that
sort, see Appendix A of Bankman et al., supra note 2.
4

uncapped — especially deductions for state
corporate income taxes — the new law will
incentivize states to shift their revenue-raising
from personal to corporate income taxes. My
concern then is that the negative consequences
from that tax shift will ultimately overpower any
positives of capping the federal deduction for
state and local personal income taxes.
A more comprehensive evaluation of the
policy concerns and tradeoffs regarding these
questions is beyond this essay’s scope. But even
for those who — like me — would support
capping federal SALT deductions in the abstract,
there are reasons to fear that the new federal cap
on these deductions might do more harm than
good.
Moreover, regarding the question of how state
governments should act, it must be recognized
that they primarily have a duty to their residents
and only secondarily to federal policy concerns.
Of course, cooperation among states and between
states and the federal government is important. In
other scenarios, the merits of promoting
cooperation should perhaps trump a state’s
desires to act in the narrow interests of its
residents.
Yet in the scenarios we are faced with, states
have been subjected to new federal legislation that
was rushed through in a secretive, highly partisan
manner.6 In these circumstances, it seems
reasonable for states like California and New York
to respond with measures that promote the
interests of state residents over arguably
countervailing national interests regarding
cooperation.
By contrast, Treasury and the IRS are charged
with promoting the national interest regarding
tax policy and tax design. With that in mind,
should Treasury and the IRS then use their
regulatory powers to combat state-level efforts of
that sort?
One reason for Treasury and the IRS to be
cautious is that there are serious administrative
concerns that would follow from how either
might use its regulatory authority for those
purposes. My essay coauthors are working on a

Id.

5

My views can be found in Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax
Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,” 111 Nw. U.
L. R 295 (2017).
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6

See Samuel A. Donaldson, “Understanding the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act” (Jan. 8, 2018) (“the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the product of a
deeply partisan and largely closed-door process”).
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follow-up to explain those problems, so I will not
elaborate here.
Another reason for Treasury and the IRS to
refrain from using regulatory authority, at least
regarding the smarter way design, is that states
might then respond with other approaches to
effectively preserve the benefits of the federal
SALT deduction. Along with another set of
coauthors, I explain some of these approaches in
two other draft essays.7 We are currently revising
and explaining the arguments in those essays to
submit for publication.
Considering the myriad options available to
states, Treasury and the IRS ultimately lack the
power to prevent them from acting to preserve the
benefits of the prior SALT deduction. Doing so
effectively would require new, better drafted
federal-level legislation. For instance, Daniel
Hemel has described other approaches that states
could take in “States and Localities Can Offset
8
Federal Tax Law’s Impact on Their Residents.”
And at the extreme, no regulatory authority
would enable Treasury or the IRS to prevent state
governments from just shifting away from the use
of personal income taxes and toward the use of
(fully deductible) corporate income taxes.
Again, fully evaluating these possibilities is
beyond the scope of this article. For here and now,
my conclusions are just the following:
1. Under current federal law, the smarter
way design should work.
2. Treasury and the IRS have the
regulatory authority to change that aspect
of federal law.
3. However, absent new federal
legislation, there are persuasive policy
reasons for Treasury and the IRS to refrain
from issuing those regulations.
4. Ultimately, new federal legislation is
needed to fix the flawed cap on federal
SALT deductions.


7

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Games They Will Play: An Update on
the Conference Committee Tax Bill” (unpublished manuscript); and AviYonah et al., “The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and
Glitches Under the New Legislation” (unpublished manuscript).
8

Daniel Jacob Hemel, “States and Localities Can Offset Federal Tax
Law’s Impact on Their Residents,” Bloomberg Tax: Daily Tax Report: State
(Jan. 12, 2018).
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